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Public-Private Partnerships,
Civic Engagement,
and School Reform
Theodore J. Kowalski
University of Dayton
Journal of Thought, Fall-Winter 2010
What we know to do far exceeds what we are free to do.
—James Moffett (1994, p. 589)
 The number of partnerships between public schools and private 
organizations increased dramatically after the National Commission on 
Excellence in Education (1983) issued its report, A Nation at Risk. Prior 
to 1983, only 17% of the elementary and secondary schools in the United 
States had been engaged in these collaborative ventures. By 1989, the 
gure had increased to 40% (Marenda, 1989); by 1991, businesses alone 
were engaged in more than 140,000 partnerships with schools (Rigden, 
1991); and by 2000, it was estimated that several hundred thousand 
businesses were collaborating with schools (Partners in Education, 2000). 
Moreover, The Council for School & Corporate Partnerships (n.d.) reports 
that collaborating businesses have contributed an estimated $2.4 billion 
to aid schools. These statistics are undeniably impressive and suggest 
that alliances between public schools and private organizations have 
been highly productive. In truth, however, there is little empirical evi-
dence supporting the contention that public-private partnerships have 
improved student learning; and at the same time, these ventures have 
sparked consequential questions about the critical nature of democratic 
localism and civic volunteerism in school reform.
 In this essay, I propose an uncommon perspective of public-private 
partnerships in the United States—one that calls for direct citizen involve-
ment to ensure that collaboration is linked to and compatible with reform 
efforts carried out at the local (school district) level. The need for a new 
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conceptualization is framed by three convictions: public-private partner-
ships have been largely ineffective in terms of improving instruction and 
student learning; democratic de!cits in these ventures are incompatible 
with the concept of local control and potentially detrimental to school 
reform; and, civic engagement should become a normative standard for 
shaping, implementing, and evaluating school-improvement initiatives. 
In building a case for direct citizen involvement, I !rst examine part-
nerships in terms of motives, outcomes, and factors in"uencing success. 
Then civic engagement is de!ned and discussed in relation to public-
private partnerships operating in the prevailing political environment 
found in most local school systems. Lastly, recommendations are made 
for addressing objectionable aspects of public-private partnerships.
Motives and Outcomes in Public-Private Collaboration
 Conventionally, a partnership is a formal arrangement involving 
two or more parties intended to bene!t all collaborators. Public-private 
partnerships speci!cally include associations between a governmental 
agency and either a private pro!t-seeking or private non-pro!t orga-
nization. Though public schools have been engaged in a variety of col-
laborative efforts with most being in the public-private class, the word, 
partnership, has not been de!ned precisely. As a result, it has been used 
indiscriminately to describe different levels of associations (Kowalski, 
2008). Because of this indistinctiveness, generalizations about education 
partnerships have had limited value. Nevertheless, it is advantageous 
to understand why collaborators have been drawn to these projects, the 
extent to which the projects have achieved their goals, and the condi-
tions that have affected goal achievement.
Motives
 Many reasons underlie the popularity of public-private partnerships. 
From a societal perspective, citizens support these initiatives because 
they believe that an infusion of private capital into public education 
is socially and personally bene!cial (Crow, 1998). Furthermore, they 
believe that corporate executives and school administrators have a 
positive in"uence on each other. This latter conviction is supported 
by policy literature suggesting that public institutions do some things 
better than private organizations and vice versa (Ghere, 1996). As ex-
amples, governmental institutions are thought to be more effective at 
generating public interest, providing stewardship, responding to social 
needs, and ensuring social justice; conversely, private organizations 
are thought to be better at developing creative solutions, generating 
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resources, applying technology, and producing managerial efciency 
(Rosenau, 1999). Generally, supporters of public-private partnerships 
hope that the associations will modernize school administration as a 
result of superintendents and principals emulating the best attributes 
of the private sector (Woods & Woods, 2004).
 During much of the previous century, school ofcials were less than 
enthusiastic about teaming up with external agencies and organiza-
tions—primarily because they accepted the bureaucratic tenet that such 
connections diminished technical efciency (Hanson, 2003). Though this 
underlying assumption continued to be held by many educators during 
the past few decades (Davies, 2002), demands for reform and advocacy 
for public-private partnerships after 1983 basically trumped this reserva-
tion (Rist, 1990; Sipple, Matheney, & Miskel, 1997). Concurrently, school 
ofcials began recognizing that collaborating with high prole executives 
could enhance their social capital (Wang, Haertel, & Walbert, 1995)—an 
asset they could use to counteract public criticism. Therefore, most part-
nerships have been pragmatic ventures rather than associations nested 
in democratic values and beliefs (Merz & Furman, 1997).
 The reasons why private organization executives elected to partner 
with schools have ranged from altruism to utilitarianism (Austin & As-
sociates, 2004). Altruistic motives include intentions such as wanting to 
serve society, to improve the quality of community life, and to help educa-
tors and students succeed. Utilitarian motives, by comparison, include 
intentions such as wanting to in!uence public scal or curricular policy, to 
enhance corporate image, and to increase prots. Though public schools are 
considered to serve both public and private purposes (e.g., Chubb & Moe, 
1990; Levin, 1987), critics of school-business partnerships (e.g., Abowitz, 
2000; Boyles, 1998; Cromarty, 1997; Spring, 1998) contend that business 
executives have gotten involved in partnerships largely or exclusively to 
advance corporate interests—for example, to be able to advertise in or 
through schools. Hewitt (2007) posits that their overarching motive has 
been to establish consumption as the ultimate expression of participatory 
democracy. Exclusive vending rights agreements involving public schools 
provide compelling evidence to support his claim. Since 1980, thousands 
of districts and schools have given soft drink companies exclusive rights 
to sell their products; in return, schools are rewarded by receiving money 
or other forms of remuneration, such as athletic score boards (Addonizio, 
2000). These transactional contracts have sparked both economic concerns, 
such as restricting competition, and ethical concerns, such as promoting 
unhealthy products to students (Kowalski, 2006).
 The appropriateness and consequences of private businesses becom-
ing involved in public education have been debated for nearly 100 years. 
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Noted historian, Raymond Callahan (1962), for example, concluded that 
captains of industry had a profound effect on public education as early 
as 1910. By manipulating school superintendents, they infused their 
values into school administration and curriculum—for example, by get-
ting superintendents to accept scienti!c management and by getting 
schools to focus on workforce development. And though criticisms of 
corporate involvement in education have been prominent in the litera-
ture throughout the previous century, it is estimated that commercial 
activity in schools increased by 473% just during the 1990s (Molnar & 
Reaves, 2001). Defenders of public-private partnerships contend that 
despite their possible shortcomings, these projects have strengthened 
bonds between schools and citizens; and as a result, students, society, 
and businesses bene!tted (Larson, 2002).
Outcomes
 Many school partnerships were never evaluated to determine if they 
actually achieved their goals, and !ndings and conclusions for those that 
have are frequently questionable and misleading. The limited attention 
given to program evaluation is partially explained by collaborator indif-
ference, especially their apathy toward determining the extent to which 
schools were being improved (Trachtman, 1994). In addition, four other 
issues either have prevented program evaluation or have made process 
exceptionally dif!cult.
1. Variation of association. As previously noted, partnerships 
involving schools have been dissimilar in nature and purpose. 
True partnerships are thought to have: (a) formal and legal 
standing (Smith & Wholstetter, 2006), (b) speci!c and mutu-
ally agreed upon goals (Barnett, Hall, Berg, & Camarena, 
1999), and (c) equal or near equal authority and responsibility 
between or among partners (Lasley, Matczynski, & Williams, 
1992; Tushnet, 1993). Evaluations of projects that fail to meet 
one or more of these criteria could produce misleading !ndings 
and conclusions.
2. Vague and immeasurable goals. Often partnerships were cre-
ated quickly and little forethought was given to stating speci!c, 
measurable goals (Edens & Gilsinan, 2005). When this oversight 
occurred, success was treated as a relative term. As an example, 
a recent research report published by The Council for School 
& Corporate Partnerships (n.d.), an organization promoting 
public-private collaboration, claims that most school-business 
partnerships have and continue to be successful. Yet, no empiri-
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cal data on either instructional changes or student learning are 
provided; the only relevant information appearing to support 
this conclusion is a nding that 87% of the school administrators 
surveyed were extremely satised or satised with the “ability” 
of their projects to meet intended goals.
3. Goal displacement. Goal displacement is a condition in which 
the means by which a goal is pursued becomes more important 
than the goal (Hanson, 2003). Dynamic social, economic, and 
political conditions make all school reform goals susceptible 
to displacement (Stone, Orr, & Worgs, 2006). The effect of this 
condition on program evaluation is demonstrated by a partner-
ship between a university and local school districts. The project’s 
espoused intent was to increase college readiness among minority 
and disadvantaged students. According to Laguardia (1998), the 
college ofcials deemed the partnership to be at least somewhat 
successful even though data clearly indicated that student re-
tention and graduation rates had not improved. For the college 
ofcials, sustaining the partnership apparently became more 
important than improving student readiness.
4. Focusing entirely or primarily on resource acquisition. When 
judged on the basis of this criterion, most partnerships appear to 
be doing well. As an example, many authors (e.g., Choin-Kenney, 
1989; Crow, 1998; Edelstein, 1989; Gonsalves, 2003) contend 
that additional resources are essential to carry out reforms; and 
therefore, when these assets are received by schools, there is 
a tendency to conclude that they have improved school perfor-
mance. Smith and Wohlstetter (2006), for example, wrote that 
partnerships had contributed to school improvement by “offering 
access to additional resources, expertise and knowledge” (p. 265). 
Experiences during the 1980s, however, indicate that added 
resources alone rarely elevate student learning (Kirst, 1988).
 Logically, the extent and quality of school-improvement should be 
determined either by value-added effects on student learning or by in-
structional changes that improve the probability of student social and 
intellectual growth (Davies, 2002). One of the few studies examining 
the latter criterion was conducted by Miron and Wimpelberg (1989) 
in a very large urban district. Seeking to determine if school-business 
partnerships had contributed to school reform, they found that only 8 
of 450 projects had produced any instructional changes. More recently, 
Gelberg (2007) concluded that resources acquired through partner-
Public-Private Partnerships76
ships—assets such as pre-packaged curricula, additional equipment, and 
improved facilities—rarely if ever made a difference in the day-to-day 
lives of students. Moreover, dependency on private funds can result in 
unanticipated negative consequences. For example, private funding may 
make local and state ofcials less inclined to increase public funding 
(Fege & Hagelshaw, 2000).
 Some research on public-private partnerships suggests that fears about 
possible exploitation are warranted. The potential for abuse arguably 
increased after the primary locus for reform became districts and schools. 
School-improvement in districts and schools is de facto a con!ict-ridden 
process because power is distributed (usually unequally) among individu-
als, groups, and organization possessing dissimilar education values and 
interests (Datnow, 2000). Thus, partnerships can be exploited by power 
elites seeking to in!uence policy decisions in areas such as school reform 
and corporate taxes (Mickelson, 1999). And when school ofcials and 
corporate executives forge reforms in isolation, stakeholders are unable 
to identify, evaluate, and challenge their objectives (Taylor, 2000).
 Some partnerships appear to have been transactional agreements; 
that is, school ofcials were expected overtly or covertly to return favors. 
Zimmer, Krop, and Brewer (2003), for example, found that the acquisi-
tion of resources typically required principals to engage in “reciprocal 
relationships with private sponsors” (p. 512).
Limiting Factors
 Common pitfalls associated with school partnerships have been widely 
addressed in the literature. The most frequently identied difculties have 
included inadequate planning (Gardner, 1990), in!exible goals (MacDowell, 
1989), distrust among collaborators (Fisler & Firestone, 2006; Lieberman, 
1986), competing organizational goals (Kowalski, 1993), and unresolved 
con!ict (Dallmer, 2004). Though relevant, these problems do not explain 
fully why many partnerships have not improved student learning. The 
following are other issues that may be relevant to this limitation.
• Focusing on resources and not student learning. Scholars (Good-
win & Dean, 2008; Fullan, 2001, 2007; Murphy, 1991) note that 
would-be reformers frequently erred by focusing on characteris-
tics of low-performing schools rather than the underlying causes 
of low performance. In this vein, persons controlling partnerships 
also may have erred by assuming that the reduction of school 
resource decits would de facto elevate school performance. As 
Kirst (1988) correctly pointed out, scal intensication is not a 
reform but rather support for reform initiatives.
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• Having collaborators from incompatible organizational cul-
tures. Analyzing school-business partnerships, Abowitz (2000) 
found that the incompatible interests and intentions of the col-
laborating organizations often produced intense con!ict, power 
struggles, and manipulation. Business executives and educa-
tors not only embrace different values and beliefs (Goodwin & 
Dean, 2008; LeDoux & McHenry, 2008), both groups typically 
are unprepared to join forces to produce school reform (Epstein 
& Sanders, 2006).
• Ignoring intangible assets. Business executives frequently did 
not recognize or elected not to capitalize on intangible assets, 
such as "rst-hand knowledge of classroom problems and cre-
ative curricular and instructional ideas, possessed by educators 
(Goodwin & Dean, 2008).
• Failing to tailor reforms. Partnerships frequently focused on 
generic reform ideas and not the speci"c needs of a district or 
school (Wohlstetter & Smith, 2006).
• Ignoring the micropolitical context. Though con!ict between 
partners has been addressed extensively in the literature, far 
less attention has been given to the dynamics between partner-
ships and community interest groups (Firestone & Fisler, 2002). 
In many school districts, pressure groups still exert considerable 
in!uence but the extent to which their power is affected by public-
private partnerships is basically unknown. Likewise, the degree 
to which partnerships have eroded public values and the spirit of 
local control remains undetermined (West & West, 2004).
• Having democratic decits. Whenever public policy is devel-
oped in a vacuum, democracy and equity emerge as legitimate 
concerns because citizens are unable to pursue their individual 
rights (Miraftab, 2004). In the case of public-private partner-
ships, collaborators often wrongly assumed that persuading oth-
ers to support their initiatives was the same as democratically 
involving citizens in crafting reforms (Gold, Cucchiara, Simon, & 
Riffer, 2005). Descriptions of failed reforms (e.g., Brandt, 1998; 
Frahm, 1994) reveal that citizens who feel disempowered have 
been able to scuttle change initiatives, even those that were 
highly defensible and obviously needed.
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Civic Engagement and School Reform
 Civic engagement is a liberty-based concept through which persons 
exercise authority and power in relation to governmental decisions 
(Cooper, Fusarelli, & Randall, 2004). Scholars have long sought to 
comprehend conditions under which citizens seek to inuence public 
policy; however, conducting research on this topic has been challeng-
ing due to dynamic, intricate, and dif!cult to validate circumstances 
surrounding it (Cooper, Bryer, & Meek, 2006). Even so, the literature 
validates stakeholder inuence in a democracy is a fundamental right 
(e.g., Fishkin, 1991; Levin, 1999; Roberts, 1997; Skocpol, 1993) and 
provides consensus that direct citizen participation locally is advan-
tageous to school reform politically and economically (e.g., Bauman, 
1996; Christman, 2003; Duke, 2004, 2008; Mediratta, 2007; Sanders, 
2003; Warren, 2005).
Decline of Democratic Localism
 Public education’s governance structure is most accurately described 
as representative democracy, a form of government in which school board 
members in conjunction with professional administrators make deci-
sions on behalf of the local communities. Prior to World War II, school 
district residents could and often did impose their values and political 
dispositions on policy decisions directly through a process known as 
democratic localism (Katz, 1971). Town hall meetings, for example, 
provided forums in which stakeholders could exercise authority and 
power. Though multiple factors led to the demise of democratic localism 
after 1950, six were especially inuential.
1. Progressive reforms. Beginning in the early decades of the 
20th century, a reform movement was initiated to make the ad-
ministrative arms of government more ef!cient, scienti!c, and 
managerial. The movement was premised on convictions that 
citizen involvement should be limited to important elections 
and citizens should leave the administration of government to 
elected of!cials and competent appointees (Cooper et al., 2006). 
Incrementally, board members and superintendents began mak-
ing decisions for the community rather than making them with 
the community (Knezevich, 1984).
2. Loss of political capital. The loss of power that previously 
enabled citizens to inuence school policy was symptomatic of a 
broader societal change that diminished political participation 
across both public and private organizations. Even the percent-
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age of citizens actively involved in churches and labor unions 
declined after 1950 (Putnam, 1995).
3. Growing mistrust of government. As early as the 1960s, it 
was apparent that the interests of many citizens were not being 
addressed adequately by either elected of!cials or professional 
administrators. Citizens feeling disenfranchised often became 
dissatis!ed with their governmental representatives (Lan, 
1997), and they no longer trusted them to make decisions on 
their behalf (Nye, Zelikow, & King, 1997).
4. Personal withdrawal. After World War II, the population in 
the typical community and school district became less homo-
geneous; and as a result, con"ict among stakeholder groups 
having different and often competing philosophies became 
common. In this political context, many who did not want to 
become embroiled in controversial issues opted to remain silent 
(Hodgkinson, 2002).
5. School district consolidation. From 1937 to 2000, the number 
of local school districts in the United States declined from ap-
proximately 119,000 to less than 15,000 (Digest of Education 
Statistics, 2002). The decrease was due almost entirely to school 
district consolidation. These mergers, often required or strongly 
encouraged by state government, were intended to produce 
economies of scale (Gordon & Knight, 2005) and to ensure that 
all students had access to a reasonably comprehensive curricu-
lum delivered by quali!ed teachers (Knezevich, 1984). As local 
districts got larger, however, citizens had fewer opportunities 
to in"uence policy decisions.
6. Legal protection of adequacy and equality. During the last 
half of the previous century, adequacy and equality issues were 
litigated in most states as a result of plaintiffs challenging the 
constitutionality of state funding formulas for public schools. 
Judicial rulings in these matters directly and indirectly promoted 
greater state in"uence (centralization) and less local in"uence 
in setting policy (Guthrie, Springer, Rolle, & Houck, 2007; King, 
Swanson, & Sweetland, 2003).
Representative Democracy and School Reform
 In a representative democracy, citizen engagement is indirect; 
that is, it serves as a complement or supplement and not a primary 
decision-making format (Pratchett, 1999). In a postindustrial society, 
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direct citizen participation was considered impractical both because the 
growing complexity of public administration required technical, political, 
and administrative expertise that most citizens did not possess (Dahl, 
1989) and because most citizens could not or would not devote the time 
required to make important decisions (Roberts, 2004). In the realm of 
public elementary and secondary education, acceptance of representative 
democracy was premised on two expectations: the demographic pro!les 
of school boards and local communities would be similar, and both board 
members and administrators would make impartial decisions bene!t-
ting the community rather than political interest groups (Meier, 1993). 
Dissatisfaction with public schools voiced after 1980 implied that one 
or both assumptions were not being met (Bauman, 1996; Lan, 1997).
 Between 1983 and 1988, state policymakers, in counsel with business 
elites, took command of school reform. Convinced that educators either 
could not or would not act independently to improve schools (Metz, 1990; 
Rubin, 1984), they relied on a political-coercive change strategy and in-
tensi!cation tactics. Most notably, state policymakers elevated resources 
and required students and educators do more of what they were already 
doing (Kirst, 1988). Finn (1991) described this conceptualization of school 
reform as “simple, uniform, universal, and abrupt” (p. 42). But after a few 
years, the would-be reformers realized their efforts were only moderately 
successful (Hawley, 1988), partly because they had disregarded variations 
in real student needs (Passow, 1988) and partly because they had under-
estimated the power of teachers to circumvent mandates (Fullan, 2001; 
Hall & Hord, 2001). Concurrently, !scal intensi!cation, e.g., increasing 
state funding and raising starting teacher salaries, had little discernible 
effect on school performance (Kirst, 1988).
 Circa 1990, policymakers in a number of states shifted the locus 
of reform to the local level, made school of!cials accountable for school 
improvement (Henkin 1993; Murphy, 1994), and mandated that stake-
holders be involved in local reforms (Louis, Tool, & Hargreaves, 1999). 
According to Weiler (1990), the new strategy was based on the concept 
of directed autonomy. Speci!cally, state of!cials (a) set broad improve-
ment goals, (b) gave districts leeway to determine how the goals would 
be met, (c) conducted periodic progress evaluations, and (d) then held 
local of!cials accountable for outcomes. This arrangement required school 
board members and administrators to determine what needed to be done 
to improve schools; previously they only were required to determine how 
they would implement federal and state mandates (Kowalski, Petersen, 
& Fusarelli, 2007).
 Developing and implementing reforms locally, however, is exceed-
ingly complex and dif!cult; because, critical choices must be made at 
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the point where societal rights intersect directly with individual rights 
(Levin, 1999). Individual rights relate to the experiences, inuences, and 
values parents want expressed to their children in local schools; societal 
rights relate to the experiences, inuences, and values society wants 
reproduced through a common public school curriculum (Gutmann, 1987). 
In a representative democracy, conict between individual and societal 
rights also is exacerbated by (a) citizen dissatisfaction with governmental 
of!cials (Levin, 1999), (b) a proclivity of disgruntled citizens to rely on 
confrontation to advance their interests (Björk & Gurley, 2005; Björk & 
Keedy, 2005), and (c) pervasive tensions between professionalism and 
democracy that result in seemingly contradictory expectations for public 
administrators (Cooper et al., 2006; King & Stivers, 1998). In the realm 
of public schools, both administrators (Wirt & Kirst, 2005) and teach-
ers (Zeichner, 1991) are expected to make important decisions based on 
professional knowledge—but to do so while remaining subservient to 
the will of the people.
Civic Engagement Approaches
 According to Cooper and associates (2006) civic engagement is most 
accurately described when analyzed across !ve dimensions: involvement 
(the size, depth and diversity of participation), initiation (persons or 
groups responsible for igniting participation), purpose (motivation and 
goals), location (political arena such as state or local level), and, approach 
(participation method or process). Focusing on the last dimension, St. 
John and Daun-Barnett (2008) described three ways citizens could be 
involved in school reform: the adversarial approach, the electoral ap-
proach, and the communicative approach.
 The adversarial approach is based on the assumption that pressure 
groups pursue their interests most effectively by politically confronting 
governmental of!cials (Cooper et al., 2006). As an example, parents and 
other stakeholders contesting curricular proposals, such as teaching 
sex education or the theory of evolution, often elect to politically oppose 
incumbent board members and publicly criticize administrators. Though 
adversarial tactics can produce bene!cial change, more often they de-
stroy or damage relationships between school of!cials and stakeholder 
groups (Feuerstein, 2002). In their seminal research on the politics of 
public education, Lutz and Iannaccone (1978) found that confrontations 
initiated by pressure groups frequently led to organizational instabil-
ity—characterized initially by the defeat of incumbent board members, 
subsequently by the dismissal of superintendents, and ultimately by 
internal institutional volatility.
 The electoral approach to civic engagement also has been prevalent 
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in public education; school board elections and tax referenda are primary 
examples (Edelman, 1985). Though widely deployed and accepted as 
an ef!cient democratic procedure, relying on elections to ensure civic 
engagement is a dubious decision because many citizens fail to exercise 
their right to vote (Feuerstein, 2002; Lutz & Iannaccone, 1978; Wirt & 
Kirst, 2005). In some communities, for example, 90% of eligible voters 
have failed to cast a ballot in school board elections (Grossman, 2005). 
Moreover, elections are expensive and they may actually discourage 
more effective forms of citizen participation.
 The communicative approach entails deliberative democracy—a 
concept expressed by the belief that “candid, two-way communication, 
especially the exchange of ideals that could radically alter the organization 
of public schools, is foundational to school reform” (St. John & Daun-
Barnett, 2008, p. 66). With this alternative, stakeholders, encouraged 
by superintendents and other school of!cials (Kowalski, 2005; Kowalski 
& Keedy, 2005), state and then test their opinions in an effort to reach 
consensus (Medearis, 2005). The method is characterized by (a) open 
and candid dialogue, (b) joint action, and (c) shared commitment and 
responsibility (Cooper et al., 2006; Etzioni, 1993; Fishkin, 1991). Though 
the communicative approach is the most democratic alternative, it also 
is the most contentious and inef!cient.
Improving Public-Private Partnerships
 In the realm of school reform, public-private partnerships that 
transferred private resources to schools and infused managerial ideas 
into public policy were commonly deemed successful (Rosenau, 1999). 
Increasingly, this perspective is being challenged by the conviction that 
not all partnerships are bene!cial or even benign. This fact is most appar-
ent in several European countries where concerns about the detrimental 
effects of democratic de!cits and about potential exploitation have led 
to federal policy regulating public-private partnerships (Sorensen & 
Tor!ng, 2005).
Governmental Mandates
 Concurrently promoting public-private partnerships and recognizing 
the detrimental effects of democratic de!cits in them, federal of!cials 
in the United Kingdom (U.K.) began mandating direct citizen engage-
ment through neighborhood regeneration initiatives enacted in 1997. 
Programs such as the English Local Strategic Partnerships supposedly 
ensured citizen in"uence in collaborative efforts involving public local 
agencies, business, and community groups (Johnson & Osborne, 2003). 
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Commonly referred to as democratic networking, the connections are 
intended to give local residents the capacity to participate and remain 
engaged in the hopes that partnerships will endure (Diamond, 2004). 
Fundamentally, the mandate requires a communicative approach to civic 
engagement. Several authors (e.g., Skelcher, 2005; Sorensen & Tor!ng, 
2005) believe that communities empowered by mandated democratic 
networks can address democracy and equity issues suf!ciently.
 Not all scholars, however, have a positive opinion of mandated 
democratic networks. Davies (2007), for example, argues that the U.K. 
law neither produced acceptable levels of direct citizen participation nor 
prevented projects from evolving into bureaucratic endeavors—projects 
in which public managers continued to emphasize ef!ciency over power 
sharing. Lamenting what he calls “creeping managerialism” (p. 796) in 
U.K. public-private partnerships, he proposes that a confrontational 
approach to civic engagement is more likely to empower citizens and to 
result in strong independent community groups capable of challenging 
public managers and private collaborators.
Proposed Change in the United States
 In light of their potential to limit civic engagement and to result in 
exploitation, we must ask why public-private partnerships have not been 
scrutinized more carefully in this country. The inattention may stem 
from school of!cials and stakeholders believing that private resources 
de facto improve school performance. It also may stem from a conviction 
that collaboration is politically advantageous, essentially harmless, and 
actually a goal rather than a means to a goal (Bruner, 1991). In truth, 
private resources can improve the ecology of schools (e.g., facilities and 
equipment) but there is little evidence that these improvements directly 
affect student learning. In addition, some public-private partnerships 
have been controversial and possibly counterproductive with respect to 
directly involving citizens in school reform.
 When all the facts are considered, the need to question the merit of 
partnerships as a reform tactic is axiomatic. In deliberating the true value 
of these ventures, we should ask and answer four essential questions.
1. Why is democratic participation philosophically appropriate? 
More than 150 years ago, Alexis de Tocqueville described Ameri-
can democracy as being rooted in civic voluntarism, including 
active involvement in schools through political participation 
(Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Effective local control still 
depends on citizen having opportunities to in"uence important 
policy decisions (Cunningham, 2003); and denying persons their 
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right to be heard is inconsistent with democratic principles (Hann, 
2008). In a representative democracy, however, sharing authority 
and responsibility becomes a value-based decision. That is, elected 
of!cials and public administrators convey a value position when 
they decide matters affecting citizen participation. This value 
position expresses a conviction “about who deserves power and 
who does not, who will always have to struggle for power and who 
will not and most importantly who gets to ‘steer’ and who does 
not” (Kennedy, 2003, p. 57). The right to engage in deliberative 
discourse does not mean, however, that self-interests should never 
be suspended to serve societal interests (Roberts, 1997).
2. Why is democratic participation politically advantageous 
for school reform? Analyzing civic engagement, Box (1998) 
identi!ed three categories of citizens: (a) “freeriders,” passive 
persons content having others making decisions for them; (b) 
“watchdogs,” persons periodically involved and engaged in po-
litical action based on the extent to which an issue is deemed 
personally relevant; and (c) “activists,” persons deeply involved 
in public life and consistently engaged in political action (pp. 
73-74). Though activists generally constitute less than 10% of a 
community’s population (Verba et al., 1995), their in"uence can 
be considerable—especially when they are supported politically 
by watchdogs. In the case of school reform, philosophical and 
political diversity virtually ensures that any proposed initiative 
will be opposed by a segment of the community (Stone et al., 
2006). And even in a representative democracy, citizen activism 
can derail school-improvement initiatives.
3. Why not eliminate public-private partnerships? Eliminat-
ing public-private partnerships because of their imperfections 
would be reckless for several reasons. First, public support for 
these ventures always has been high (Gittell, 1994; Rosenau, 
1999; Shipps, 1998); and, doing away with them would almost 
certainly result in political problems for school boards and 
superintendents. Second, school-business partnerships have 
infused a considerable amount of private capital into public 
education, and though the effects of these funds in the past are 
debatable, the need for philanthropy to support future reforms 
is not (Gelberg, 2007). Third, public-private partnerships can 
elevate the social capital of school of!cials, an asset critical to 
pursuing reform locally (Wang et al., 1995).
Theodore J. Kowalski 85
4. Why not mandate civic engagement? To this point, mandating 
civic engagement (e.g., as in the U.K.), has not resolved democ-
racy and equity concerns in public-private partnerships (Davies, 
2007), and some scholars (e.g., Perrons & Skyer, 2003) question 
whether government mandates can ever achieve authentic 
democratic processes. Though coercion enforced with sanctions 
produces compliance, choice and commitment are more likely 
to result in education excellence (Kelly, 1999)—and they are 
more likely to foster legitimate democratic processes in local 
communities (Kowalski et al., 2007).
 Based on the preceding perspectives, three recommendations are 
offered for improving public-private partnerships. First, they should be 
designed to be both practical (e.g., focused on improving school perfor-
mance) and philosophical (e.g., promoting and protecting civic engage-
ment) initiatives. This dual purpose would help prevent partnerships 
from operating as independent reform initiatives unaccountable to 
stakeholders. Second, rather than resorting to government mandates 
to eradicate democratic de!cits, the education profession and local com-
munities should embrace civic engagement as a normative standard for 
partnerships and school reform activities. This alternative is compatible 
with the spirit of civic voluntarism and with maintaining local control 
through the selective application of democratic localism. Third, all 
public-private partnerships should have an accountability component 
that requires the relevance of and progress toward project goals to be 
evaluated annually. In addition to assessing speci!c school-improve-
ment objectives, program evaluations should examine the extent to 
which (a) democratic localism is encouraged and tolerated in relation 
to school reform, (b) social capital is accumulated, (c) relevant resources 
are acquired, and (d) exploitation is avoided.
Final Thoughts
 Based on statistics, one could conclude that public-private partner-
ships are more fashionable now than at any time in the past. Yet, they 
often have been poorly con!gured and managed (Edens & Gilsinan, 
2005); they rarely have lived up to their reform rhetoric (Gelberg, 2007); 
they have made public schools more vulnerable to exploitation (Abow-
itz, 2000; Boyles, 1998, 2001); and, they typically have operated with 
democratic de!cits (Miraftab, 2004). Yet, surprisingly little attention 
has been given to challenging the popular conviction that they have 
contributed to school reform.
 Among the concerns addressed here, democratic de!cits are especially 
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troubling because they are philosophically unacceptable and arguably a 
barrier to direct citizen involvement. Most authors who have analyzed 
the political and philosophical dimensions of school reform (e.g., Bauman, 
1996; Duke, 2004, 2008; Fullan, 2001, 2007) agree that stakeholders 
need to be involved more directly in critical activities, such as shaping 
visions, developing strategic plans, and formulating school-improvement 
policy. Therefore, partnerships are more effective when public schools 
are viewed as belonging to local communities (Decker & Decker, 2003) 
and when citizens are treated as owners (stakeholders) rather than as 
clients or subjects (Vigoda, 2002).
 Protracted efforts to improve schools, most recently at the local 
level, help us understand why engaging in representative democracy 
through traditional bureaucracy is philosophically inappropriate and 
operationally counterproductive. Denied opportunities to pursue their 
individual rights, citizens, including some who are normally passive, 
become confrontational (Levin, 1999). Though the confrontational ap-
proach occasionally has been deployed successfully to pursue individual 
rights, this civic engagement alternative can be detrimental to public 
education. The typical community in the United States, and hence typi-
cal local school district, is characterized by an uneven distribution of 
power, philosophical dissonance, and demographic diversity (Kathi & 
Cooper, 2005). Under these conditions, confrontational tactics almost 
always contribute to community fragmentation and institutional (school 
district) destabilization (Alsbury, 2003).
 The proposal for improving public-private partnerships articulated 
here is grounded in the beliefs that eliminating democratic de!cits 
decreases the probability of exploitation and increases the probability 
that partnerships will have a positive in"uence on the social and intel-
lectual development of students. The approach we adopt to eliminate 
democratic de!cits is equally important. Given the long history of civic 
voluntarism and local control in this country, mandating civic engage-
ment is paradoxical and encouraging political confrontation is divisive. 
Therefore, leaders in the education profession in concert with local 
school boards and other elected of!cials should promote direct citizen 
participation as a normative standard and explain publicly why it is an 
essential element in public-private partnerships.
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